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ABSTRACTS

committed a culpable act, not the plaintiffs geographical location.
Randall v. Shelton, 293 S.W.2d 559 (Ky. 1956).
No West Virginia case has been found that would indicate that
this state has yet adopted the Restatement view of non-liability for
unintentional, non-negligent entries to land. It must be assumed,
then, that the strict rule of liability is still applicable in West Virginia. Under this view, even if the defendant in the principal case
was not negligent, he would be held strictly liable as a trespasser
on the plaintiff's property. His only defense would be that his
entry was involuntary-that he was carried onto plaintiffs property
against his will by the act of another person.
The adoption of the new West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, abolishing the common-law forms of action and providing
for a "civil action", has no affect on the outcome of the principal
case. It is only matters of form which have been affected by these
provisions. The substantial distinctions and the principles of law
underlying the common-law forms of action remain, until modified
by statute. North River Ins. Co. v. Aetna Fin. Co., 186 Kan. 758,
352 P.2d 1060 (1960). To be entitled to recover the plaintiff need
only show that he is possessed of a right which has been violated
by the defendant, to the plaintiffs damage.
Thomas RichardRalston

ABSTRACTS
Domestic Relations--Wife's Action For Loss of Consortium
P's husband was injured in an automobile accident. P brought
an action for loss of consortium against D on the theory that D
negligently caused the injury to P's husband. D's motion to dismiss
was sustained. Held, affirmed. A wife may not maintain an action
for loss of consortium of her husband caused by the negligence of the
defendant tort-feasor. Seagraves v. Legg, 127 S.E.2d 605 (W.Va.
1962).
Note is taken that this is a case of first impression in West
Virginia. A discussion of the division of authority on this issue
is found in 63 W. VA. L. REv. 186 (1961). The author of that comment pointed out, as did the principal case, that the weight of
authority supports the view denying recovery to a wife under such
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circumstances. That author also predicted that West Virginia might
follow the majority view and deny recovery. The prediction was
based partly upon the difinition which the West Virginia court
has placed upon the term "consortium". The expression found in
Shreve v. Fars,144 W.Va. 819, 111 S.E. 2d 169 (1959), is that consortium is "a right. . .in a husband, arising from the marital
union...."

It thus appears that the pronouncement of the principal case fulfills the prediction that West Virginia would follow the majority
view in denying the wife's right to maintain an action for loss of
consortium of her husband caused by the negligence of a third
party.

Domestic Relations-Divorce--Misconduct by the Prevailing
Party Before the Entry of the Final Decree
P prevailed in her suit for absolute divorce and an interlocutory
decree was entered in accordance with the statutory provisions of
the jurisdiction. P'shusband objected to the entry of the final decree
upon learning of P's misconduct after the interlocutory decree and
before the entry of the final decree. The objection was sustained.
Held, affirmed. The prevailing party must, after the decision for
divorce, continue to comply with allegations of the petition pertaining to his or her conduct until entry of the final decree. Pakurs
v. Pakuris, 186 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1962).
While the need for such a holding is not doubted, it should be
noted that its application may not be of equal importance throughout
the various states. Many jurisdictions, such as that of the principal
case, have adopted statutory provisions for interlocutory divorce
decrees. Annot., 174 A.L.R. 519 (1948). The theory behind such
legislation is apparently the desire to afford every opportunity for
reconciliation before making the divorce final by decree. Under such
statutes, a waiting period is established during which it is hoped
that the parties will conclude that the wrong path has been taken and
the final decree should not be entered. Some parties will quietly
await the passage of the period and seek the final decree. The third
group is illustrated by P who admitted that she had lived with
with another man as his wife during the six months' period. While
one is urged to use the period for the purpose of effecting a recon-
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ciliation, he is not forced to do so. However, the period cannot
be used for acts, such as adultery, which are inconsistent with the
allegations of conduct contained in the petition for divorce. Annot.,
109 A.L.R. supra at 1009; 174 A.L.R. supra at 523.
West Virginia, however, has no interlocutory divorce statute.
The W.VA. CoDE ch. 48, art. 2, § 22 (Michie 1961), establishes a sixty
day period after the entry of the decree during which the parties
cannot remarry. Although there is apparently no authority in point,
it seems that a violation of this section does not affect the finality
of the divorce decree. Thus, in West Virginia, a divorce would
appear to be final when the decree is signed unless the decree itself
has been otherwise conditioned.
There could exist a period between the decision for divorce
and the signing of the decree in which the prevailing party could
participate in an inconsistant act. This lapse of time may be due
to the necessity of having the decree physically prepared for signing
resulting in a very short period of time during which the possibility
of such an act is quite remote. However, if an attorney is dilatory
and does not have the decree prepared and signed until the next
day or even later, he may lose his case due to his client's misconduct.
It is submitted that the rule in the principal case is not as applicable, as a practical matter, in West Virginia as in those jurisdictions which have adopted interlocutory divorce statutes. Nevertheless, as a safety precaution one should have the divorce decree
prepared and signed as soon as possible for the protection of both
the attorney and client.

Practice of Law-Completion of Legal Instruments by
One Not an Attorney
P brought a suit to enjoin a private escrow company from preparing conveyances and other specified instruments. Held, escrow
agents engage in the "practice of law" at any time they exercise
discretion in the selection or preparation of an instrument for
another, with or without cost, or if they act in an advisory capacity
in recommending or designing conveyances as an extra service to customers, but would not be engaging in the practice of law if, as
scriveners, they merely fill in blanks in warranty deeds, purchasemoney mortgages, satisfactions of mortgages and other such forms as
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may be selected by their customers. Oregon State Bar v. Security
Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 334 (Ore. 1962).
The issue in this case is the basis of concern throughout the
United States. See generally, Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 788 (1957); 3
MATINDwmx - HuBBELL LAw DmEcroRY 147A (1963); Adler, Are
Real Estate Agents Entitled To Practice A Little Law?, 4 Am. L.
REv. 188 (1963); Marks, The Lawyers and the Realtors: Arizona's
Experience, 49 A.B.A.J. 139 (1963); 1962 U. ILL. L. F. 457 (1962);
28 UNAuTHoRIZD PRACICE: NEws 357, 409, 413 (1963). Statutes
have been enacted, constitutions have been amended, many articles
have been written and studies have been made. Even with this
wealth of information, the issue is yet unsettled.
In defining the practice of law, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia clearly established that the preparation of legal instruments constitutes the practice of law and therefore must be done
by an attorney. However, no mention is made in the definition as to
the matter of "filling in" blanks in legal instruments. Defining the
Practice of Law, order of the Supreme Court of Appeals, 3 W.VA.
CoDE 221 (Michie 1961). Research fails to disclose any West
Virginia court interpretation or construction of the definition of the
practice of law on this particular point or any definitive position
taken thereon by the West Virginia State Bar Committee on Unlawful Practice.

Service of Process--Agent Authorized to Accept Service
Must Be Required to Give Notice
P, a corporation whose principal place of business is in New
York, leased certain farm equipment to Ds, residents of Michigan.
The lease provided that one W was authorized to accept service of
process for Ds in New York should Ds default under the lease. Ds
did default and P instituted a suit against Ds serving W with-a copy

of the summons and complaint. Notice was given to Ds by both W
and P although the terms of the lease did not require W to do so. P
appealed from an order quashing service of process. Held, affirmed.
The FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1) provides for service of process upon
an individual by the delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint to an agent authorized by appointment to receive service of
process. Although an agent is not required to give notice to the
principal when the parties freely contract for such service, the lack
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of a provision in the contract requiring such notice may be considered in determining the meaning and effect of the provisions of
the contract. In a two to one decision, the court determined that W
was not in fact designated an agent by Ds but was acting under an
agreement with and supervision of P by virtue of the contract of
adhesion. The illusory purported agency provision was thus ineffective to subject Ds to suit in New York. National Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent & Szukhent, 311 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1962).
W. VA. R. C. P. 4(d) (1) contains the same language as that
of the Federal Rules applied in the instant case. While the West
Virginia court is not bound by this decision and apparently has yet
to construe the language of Rule 4(d) (1), this holding may be
persuasive when the issue is presented.
Under the opinion in the principal case, the omission of the
requirement of notice is not alone sufficient to render the service
ineffective. The omission only enables the court to look to the
full provisions of the contract and if it is discovered that a true
agency was not established, the service upon that person will not
subject the purported principal to the court's jurisdiction. "Rule
4(d) (1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., provides for
service upon an agent authorized by appointment to receive service
of process. 'By appointment' means an actual appointment by the
defendant, and, if such has been made, service upon the agent gives
the court jurisdiction." Szabo v. Keeshin Motor Express Co., 10
F.R.D. 275,276 (1950).
Until the West Virginia court decides the issue, it would seem
advisable to include a provision making notice essential thereby
avoiding the possible result of the principal case should that view
be adopted.
CharlesDavid McMunn
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